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Abstract
Candidate control of elections is the study of how adding or removing candidates can affect
the outcome. However, the traditional study of the complexity of candidate control is in the
model in which all candidates and votes are known up front. This paper develops a model for
studying online control for elections where the structure is sequential with respect to the candi-
dates, and in which the decision regarding adding and deleting must be irrevocably made at the
moment the candidate is presented. We show that great complexity—PSPACE-completeness—
can occur in this setting, but we also provide within this setting polynomial-time algorithms for
the most important of election systems, plurality.
1 Introduction and Related Work
This paper introduces a framework for the study of online candidate control in sequential elections.
After introducing this issue, we provide a real-world motivating example, formalize the problem,
provide a number of results, and suggest directions for future work.
∗A preliminary version of parts of this paper appeared in the Proceedings of the 20th European Conference on Ar-
tificial Intelligence [HHR12a]. This work was supported in part by grants arc-dp110101792, DFG-RO-1202/15-1, and
NSF-CCF-{0915792,1101452,1101479}, and by COST Action IC1205, Friedrich Wilhelm Bessel Research Awards from
the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation, the NRW-MIWF project “Online Partizipation,” and the SFF grant “Cooper-
ative Normsetting” from HHU Du¨sseldorf. This work was done in part while E. and L. Hemaspaandra were visiting
Heinrich-Heine-Universita¨t Du¨sseldorf, and while J. Rothe was visiting the University of Rochester.
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We will carefully define candidate control, in particular in our sequential setting, in detail later.
However, as a quick initial sense of what candidate control traditionally has meant, so that this intro-
duction makes sense, candidate control refers to trying to ensure by adding or deleting candidates,
that a given candidate wins (or does not win). Usually, one is limited in how many candidates one
is allowed to add or delete. Computational social choice is particularly interested in the algorithmic
and complexity issues here: How hard it is to decide if in a given setting one can by such an action
achieve one’s goal?
Previous work on candidate control of elections has been in the model of full-information,
simultaneous voting. This is a problem, since in quite a few real-world settings—from TV
singing/dancing talent shows to university faculty-hiring processes—candidates are introduced, and
appraised by the voters, in sequence. We provide a natural model for sequential candidate evalu-
ation, a framework for evaluating the computational complexity of controlling the outcome within
that framework, and results on the range such complexity can take on. We hope this paper will lead
to further work examining temporally involved candidate control, and we conclude with some open
directions.
Our model of the process’s goal, having the chair try to guarantee a goal under the most hostile of
responses, is inspired by the area of online algorithms [BE98], and was used for online manipulation
in [HHR14] and for online voter control [HHR12b]. The just-mentioned papers [HHR14, HHR12b]
adopt a snapshot-in-time view of voter-sequential elections (other work about or related to voter-
sequential elections includes [Slo93, DP01, Ten04, DE10, XC10, PP13]), unlike this paper, which
takes a snapshot-in-time view with regard to candidates being the objects that are sequentially
added. This view is also in part inspired by the work of Chevaleyre et al. [CLM+12], who study the
possible winner problem when new candidates are added. Note, however, that their model and ours
differ greatly. For example, while in their model addition of candidates is not a choice (they all are
just added, at once, and the question is whether the previous votes can be extended to include this
block of new candidates such that a given candidate wins), in our model the chair has a choice each
time a new candidate shows up, and the preferences are gradually revealed just at that moment to
include that new candidate. Another different but related work, done independently of and appear-
ing after the preliminary version of this paper [HHR12a], is that of Oren and Lucier [OL14], whose
model involves votes arriving one at a time and in-the-moment choices over bundles of goods. Elec-
toral control has, in the standard (i.e., not online) setting, been studied intensively in many papers
since the seminal work of Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick [BTT92], e.g., although this is a far from
complete list, [HHR07, ENR09, FHHR09, BEH+10, FHH11, FHHR11, FHH13, Men13, RS13,
EHH14, FHH14, EFRS15, EHH15], see also the detailed survey [FR16].
2 Motivating Example
In an author’s school, faculty hiring happens basically as follows. On some Mondays, a candidate
visits, gives a talk, and meets with faculty members. Then each of the department’s rank-and-file
faculty members sends by email to the faculty and department chair her ranking of all the candidates
so far, namely, by inserting the new candidate into the preference order she sent after the previous
candidate. The chair typically follows up by phoning the candidate a day or two after the visit, so
2
that phoning occurs after the chair has seen the faculty rankings generated by the candidate’s visit.
Moving now from reality to (slight?) fiction, let us imagine that the chair in that followup can easily
choose to scare away a candidate (“Oh, did I remember to mention that if you come, your office
will be a shared closet in our lovely basement, I’ll help you broaden yourself by teaching a wide
range of introductory courses, and I see in you a real talent for extensive committee work which
I’ll put to good use?”). But let us further assume that the chair cannot do this more often than a
certain threshold, as otherwise the rank-and-file faculty will realize the chair is manipulating the
process and will revolt. So, how should the chair use this power of candidate suppression to most
effectively ensure that one of the candidates the chair likes will, at the end of the process, win the
election (under the faculty preferences, among the candidates not scared away)?
This example nearly perfectly captures the topic and model of this appendix. We are moving
what in the literature is called “candidate control” [BTT92] (in the example, of the sort known as
“constructive control by deleting candidates”) from its existing setting of simultaneous elections into
a setting where preferences are set/revealed sequentially and the chair, right after the preferences
related to an introduced candidate are revealed, must use-or-forever-lose the ability to suppress that
candidate.
We also are interested—again moved to a sequential setting—in constructive control by adding
candidates, a natural analogue of the above, and in destructive versions of both adding/deleting
candidates, which are the same issues except the chair’s goal is to ensure that none of a certain set
of hated candidates is hired.
Bartholdi, Tovey, and Trick [BTT92] defined non-online versions of the constructive-deletion
notion used above and a precursor of the constructive-addition notion used above. The non-online
versions of the constructive-addition notion used above and both destructive notions used above are
from Hemaspaandra, Hemaspaandra, and Rothe [HHR07], although destructivity had been intro-
duced even earlier by Conitzer, Sandholm, and Lang [CSL07] for a different type of attack known
as manipulation. (However, as mentioned earlier in the paper, we are consistently following the now
more standard nonunique-winner model, rather than the unique-winner model.)
3 Formalizing the Problem
Let us discuss how to formalize this into a decision problem whose complexity can be studied. We’ll
do so here in detail just for constructive control by deleting candidates, and then will describe, by
altering that, how the other online candidate-control problems are captured. Let E denote the under-
lying election system: a mapping from candidates and votes over the candidates (with preferences
typically as strict, linear orderings) to a set of winners. The candidates left standing at the end (i.e.,
not deleted by the chair) will be fed into this election system along with the votes (with each vote’s
preference order masked down to that set of still-standing candidates).
The input will capture a “moment of decision” for the chair. That is, the input will give the
history of the process up to the given point, and then will ask whether there is some action of the
chair that can ensure she will get a happy outcome. We must make it clear what we mean by this.
The input will be the set of candidates, the set of voters, the order in which the candidates will
be presented, a flag denoting which the current candidate is, a bound k on the maximum number
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of candidates the chair can suppress, an ordering σ of how the chair views all candidates (to put
this in the context of our motivating example from Section 2, this is as if the department chair
had the c.v.’s ahead of time and has evaluated them already), a specific candidate d such that the
chair’s goal is to ensure that there is an election winner from the set {c | c ≥σ d} (i.e., d or some
candidate the chair likes better than d is a winner), and the history up to the current moment in
time (which means for each candidate before the current one a bit saying whether the chair deleted
that candidate, and a preference order for each voter over all the candidates up to and including the
current one—we could also make this just over all as-yet nondeleted candidates, but let us make
it over all candidates so far, though it doesn’t affect the eventual results; we prefer this because it
allows the history of the voting situation to be part of the instance). And the question being asked
in this decision problem is whether there is some decision the chair can make about the current
candidate (to delete, or not to delete) such that, assuming that the chair at each future decision is
free to act in light of the information revealed up to that point, the chair can ensure that the winner
set will have nonempty intersection with the candidates she likes, {c | c ≥σ d}, regardless of what
else happens in the election (i.e., even if the revealed preferences are highly unfavorable to the
chair’s wishes).
The decision problem (i.e., language) here is simply the set of all inputs where the answer to
that question is yes. Let us call this problem online-E -constructive-control-by-deleting-candidates
(online-E -CCDC, for short).
Although we used a somewhat informal wording above, there is a more formally satisfying
phrasing that captures the same notion using alternating quantifiers: Does there exist a legal move by
the chair about the current candidate, such that for all possible settings of the information revealed
after this up to the chair’s next decision, there exists a legal next decision by the chair, such that
. . . . . . such that the winner set contains either d or some candidate the chair likes more than d.
Briefly, the “adding”-candidates analogue (of the above deleting-candidates case), denoted by
online-E -CCAC, is almost the same—except the input contains a “certainly in the election” set of
candidates, and a (disjoint) set of “potential additional” candidates, and a presentation ordering over
the union of those two sets, and the rest is analogous (so for potential-addition candidates before the
current one the input tells whether the chair added them, etc.).
And these constructive-control deleting and adding cases each have a “destructive control” sib-
ling, online-E -DCDC and online-E -DCAC, where the question is whether the chair can ensure that
no one “d or worse” is a winner (i.e., the chair can ensure that no member of {c | d ≥σ c} is a
winner).
For destructive control by deleting candidates, there is a special issue as to whether the chair
can simply start deleting some or all candidates who are “d or worse,” thus perhaps ruthlessly
obtaining her goal. Our default model—call it the “non-hand-tied chair” model—is that the chair
may delete some, but never all, of the candidates who are “d or worse.” An alternative model—call
it the “hand-tied chair” model—is that the chair may never delete anyone who is “d or worse.” The
results we mention in this appendix for destructive control by deleting candidates hold equally well
for both those models. In both these models, in any legal input instance, the “previous actions”
by the chair cannot violate the model, e.g., in the hand-tied chair model, if the history shows that
some candidate in {c |d ≥σ c} was deleted, then the input is rejected, as it is illegal. The history the
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snapshot provides can legally contain dumb actions, but it cannot contain illegal ones.
As always, in the language of multiagent systems candidates are alternatives and voters are
agents. So though about “elections,” this model is equally well about preference aggregation in
multiagent systems in which the alternatives are sequentially revealed and evaluated by the agents,
and another party is trying to control the outcome.
4 Complexity Results
Let us assume that our election system’s (E ’s) winner-determination problem (i.e., “Is candidate c
a winner under this election system, if the candidates and votes are C and V ?”) is in polynomial
time. Then it is easy to see from the quantifier approach mentioned above that all our above online
candidate control problems are in PSPACE. The PSPACE upper bound remains valid even if we
restrict E ’s winner problem not to P but rather to PSPACE.
Clearly, not all election systems will require the full power of PSPACE for mounting control
attacks. It is easy to construct artificial systems where all these control attacks have polynomial-
time algorithms. But a more important question is whether the PSPACE upper bound is itself too
enormous. Can such tremendous control complexity be realized, even for election systems whose
winner problems must be in polynomial time?
The answer is yes. Although the construction is not simple, we have by setting up appropriate
election systems and reductions from intractable problems, shown that for each of the problems
defined above, there is an election system with a polynomial-time winner problem for which the
online control problem of the given type is PSPACE-complete.
Briefly put, the construction enmeshes issues of formulas into election systems in a way that
so tightly incorporates and interprets formulas, variables, and assignments, that one can—by using
a careful reduction and some legal preprocessing transformations—ensure that the process of the
online control attempt can succeed exactly if the input to a PSPACE-complete formula-problem that
transformed into that problem is a positive instance.
Theorem 4.1 1. For each election system E with a polynomial-time winner problem,1
online-E -CCDC, online-E -CCAC, online-E -DCDC (in both the non-hand-tied and the hand-
tied chair model), and online-E -DCAC are in PSPACE.
2. There exist election systems E and E ′ with polynomial-time winner problems such that
online-E -CCDC, online-E -CCAC, online-E ′-DCDC (in both the non-hand-tied and the
hand-tied chair model), and online-E ′-DCAC are PSPACE-complete.
PROOF. 1. The famous characterization of PSPACE as alternating polynomial time, due to Chan-
dra, Kozen, and Stockmeyer [CKS81], establishes the upper bounds for these four problems: Each
can be solved by an alternating Turing machine in polynomial time, and thus by a deterministic
polynomial-space Turing machine.
1The first statement of Theorem 4.1 holds even for election systems whose winner problems are in PSPACE.
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2. For proving the lower bounds, we will define ≤pm-reductions from the PSPACE-complete
problem QBF to our online candidate-control problems. In fact, we will prove that these problems
are PSPACE-complete even when limited to the case of there being one voter.
We start by providing the ≤pm-reduction from QBF to online-E -CCAC for the election system
E defined as follows. Interpret each candidate as a pair (F, i), where F is a boolean formula and
i a nonnegative integer. If there are any syntactic problems, or if any two candidates have distinct
boolean formulas, then everyone loses. Otherwise, all candidates have the same boolean formula,
call it ˆF . Let ℓ be the number of variables in ˆF (e.g., ˆF = (x1∨¬x2)⇐⇒ (x3∧¬x3∧ x3) has three
variables: x1, x2, and x3). We assume that ℓ ≥ 1 (otherwise, ˆF is syntactically illegal, so everyone
loses). Now, if (a) ℓ is odd,2 or (b) the candidate set does not contain ( ˆF, i) for every even i, 0≤ i≤ ℓ,
or (c) there are two or more voters, then everyone loses. Otherwise, lexicographically order the ℓ
variables by their names. We will refer to the lexicographically ith among them as vi for the purpose
of this proof. For each odd i, 1 ≤ i ≤ ℓ, set vi to true if and only if there is a candidate named ( ˆF, i).
For each even i, 2 ≤ i ≤ ℓ, set vi to true if and only if the (single) voter prefers candidate ( ˆF , i) to
candidate ( ˆF,0). Now, if ˆF is true under this assignment then everyone wins; else everyone loses.
This ends the specification of election system E . Note that the winner problem for E is in P.
We now ≤pm-reduce QBF to online-E -CCAC. Let G be a given QBF instance, i.e., we
want to know whether G belongs to QBF. Without loss of generality, let G be of the form
(∃w1)(∀w2) · · · (∃w2 j−1)(∀w2 j) [ϕ(w1,w2, . . . ,w2 j)], where j ≥ 1 and ϕ is a propositional formula.
Now rewrite G and ϕ so that their actual variable names are lexicographically ordered in the order
w1,w2, . . . ,w2 j. Then remove all quantifiers. Call what that creates ˆF; it is basically ϕ with variable
names adjusted as above.
We will map this to the following instance of online-E -CCAC:
• the initial set of already qualified candidates is {( ˆF ,0),( ˆF ,2), . . . ,( ˆF ,2 j)};
• the set of spoiler candidates that can potentially be added is {( ˆF ,1),( ˆF ,3), . . . ,( ˆF ,2 j−1)};
• the addition bound k is j;
• the chair’s preference order σ is ( ˆF,2 j) >σ ( ˆF,2 j−1)>σ · · ·>σ ( ˆF ,0);
• the distinguished candidate d is ( ˆF ,0);
• the presentation order of the candidates is ( ˆF,0),( ˆF ,1), . . . ,( ˆF ,2 j);
• the current candidate, c, for whom the chair has to make a decision now as to whether to add
her is ( ˆF ,1); and
• the voter set is a single voter whose preference with regard to ( ˆF ,0) and ( ˆF,1) is (actually
irrelevant for the reduction but we are required by our model to provide it): ( ˆF,0) is preferred
to ( ˆF,1).
2Our reductions will always map to formulas of the form (∃w1)(∀w2) · · ·(∃w2 j−1)(∀w2 j) [· · · ].
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This completes the description of the ≤pm-reduction from QBF to online-E -CCAC, which clearly is
computable in polynomial time. It remains to prove that it is correct. This, however, is easy to see:
By definition of the election system E , G ∈ QBF if and only if the chair can make some decision
about the current candidate c (to add, or not to add) such that, assuming that the chair at each future
decision is free to act in light of the information revealed up to that point, the chair can ensure that the
winner set will have a nonempty intersection with the candidates she likes, {( ˆF , i) | ( ˆF, i)≥σ ( ˆF ,0)}
(which happens to be all candidates),3 regardless of what else happens in the election.
PSPACE-completeness of online-E -CCDC is proven very similarly. We use the same election
system, E , and from a given QBF instance G (as above) we construct an online-E -CCDC instance,
where we start with the candidate set {( ˆF , i) |0 ≤ i ≤ 2 j} and now set the deletion bound to k = j.
Everything else in the reduction remains the same. Again, it follows that G ∈ QBF if and only if
the chair can make some decision about the current candidate c (to delete, or not to delete) such
that, assuming that the chair at each future decision is free to act in light of the information revealed
up to that point, the chair can ensure that at least one candidate (all of which the chair likes) wins,
regardless of what else happens in the election.
The destructive cases can be handled quite similarly. The only difference is that we define
election system E ′ to be just like E except that we change every occurrence of “everyone loses” to
“everyone wins” and every occurrence of “everyone wins” to “everyone loses.” In our reductions
from QBF to the destructive control problems, using the same σ as the chair’s preference order and
the same distinguished candidate d = ( ˆF ,0) will be fine. In particular, it will not conflict with either
the non-hand-tied or the hand-tied chair model: Under each of those models, specifying this d and
this σ means “we cannot delete candidate ( ˆF,0),” so deleting ( ˆF,0) would be illegal; therefore, to
keep this candidate from winning, the only way is to ensure the “everyone loses” triggers due to
(∃w1)(∀w2) · · · (∃w2 j−1)(∀w2 j) [ ˆF(w1,w2, . . . ,w2 j)] holding. But this implies for each considered
case of destructive online candidate control (online-E -DCDC in both the non-hand-tied and the
hand-tied chair model and online-E -DCAC) that the given control instance is positive if and only if
G ∈ QBF. ❑
We now turn to online candidate control for some specific election system widely in use: plu-
rality. The following result shows that both constructive and destructive online control by adding
and deleting candidates is an easy problem for (candidate-sequential) plurality voting, in sharp con-
trast with the corresponding standard control problems, which are NP-complete for plurality (for
the two constructive cases, this is due to the fact that the two relevant unique-winner-model results
of [BTT92, HHR07] have been verified in [FHH14] to also hold in the nonunique-winner model;
for the two destructive cases, this is due to the fact that we have verified that the two relevant
unique-winner-model results of [HHR07] also hold in the nonunique-winner model).
Theorem 4.2 online-plurality-CCDC, online-plurality-CCAC, online-plurality-DCDC (in both the
non-hand-tied and the hand-tied chair model), and online-plurality-DCAC are in P.
PROOF. Consider an input to the problem online-plurality-CCDC as defined above. So we are
focused on some current “moment of decision” for the chair (recall what this means from page 3).
3That is, the question of online-E -CCAC will in this construction boil down to whether at least one candidate wins.
Recall that in E either everyone wins or everyone loses.
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We describe a polynomial-time algorithm for the question: Does the chair have a current action that
will ensure her of reaching her goal?
Let d be the distinguished candidate and σ be the chair’s preference. We refer to the candidates
in {a | a ≥σ d} as good candidates and to the other ones as bad candidates. As required in this
moment of decision described on page 3, each of the already revealed candidates have their flags
set as to whether or not they have been deleted, and we assume that the votes are currently masked
down to the still-standing candidates (i.e., to the already revealed, yet not deleted candidates up to
this point in time).
Rather than analyze directly what to do in this moment, let us note that we have at most two
choices in this moment. Either we leave c in, or (only if the number of allowed deletions has not
been already expended with the already done deletions) we remove c. Each of those cases leaves a
relatively pure situation, in which c is no longer special. And so what we will now do is show how
to analyze such a pure situation, i.e., to say, in such a situation, whether the chair has a forced win.
(Knowing how to do that in polynomial time implicitly resolves our problem. We just check the two
cases and see if at least one is a forced win for the chair—except if the deletion bound was already
expended then we check only the case where c is kept in and we see if that is a forced-win setting.)
So, what does such a case look like? The setting is we now are given: the set of candidates;
an ordering σ over the candidates; a designated candidate d (recall: our goal is to ensure that the
winner set has nonempty intersection with the set {a |a ≥σ d}); an order τ in which the candidates
are being revealed, where the candidates in a nonempty prefix of τ (i.e., the ones who have had the
preferences among them revealed so far) are flagged as to being either removed or kept in (and all
candidates after that in τ are not yet flagged as being in or out);4 all votes but masked down to just
the still-standing candidates (the already revealed but not deleted candidates); and a natural number
k ≥ 0, which will be how many deletions are left to use.5
And we need to know whether we have a forced win even if the universe is perfectly hostile to
us, i.e., we need to know whether no matter what votes are revealed as the process progresses we
will win (i.e., the winner set will have a nonempty intersection with {a |a ≥σ d}).
Let b be the number of bad candidates currently unrevealed.
Our polynomial-time algorithm proceeds as follows. If there is no voter, every candidate that is
left standing at the end will be a plurality winner (with score zero). So in this case our algorithm
accepts if there is at least one good candidate revealed but undeleted, or not yet revealed. And
otherwise our algorithm rejects. So henceforward, let us assume that the number of voters is at least
one.
If all candidates are already revealed, just analyze whether a good candidate is among the win-
ners, and if so, return success on this case. Otherwise, we go on as follows.
We now check whether any good candidates are currently winning. If no good candidate wins
4The prefix of τ is nonempty because “c” will already have been revealed, since we call this polynomial-time routine
only, see the previous paragraph, when at least one candidate has been set as in-or-out.
5If from the prefix of τ and the flags we find more deletions have happened than the problem originally allowed, a case
that won’t actually ever happen within the way we are calling this algorithm, we are then already in a no-win case since
we, the chair, back in the given history already violated the deletion bound. So if this (impossibly) were to happen, then
we would return the fact that forced-success along a legal path from our current state is impossible, since we’ve already
violated the rules.
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at the current moment, then (i) if there is at least one unrevealed good candidate and the number b
of unrevealed bad candidates is at most k, then we have a forced win here; (ii) otherwise return that
we don’t have a forced win here (for example, we certainly won’t win if the votes will be eventually
revealed to show that the future—i.e., as yet unrevealed—bad candidates are a top segment of every
voter’s vote).
Otherwise, at least one good candidate is currently winning (according to the votes masked
down to the still-standing candidates up to the current point). We first check whether k ≥ b, i.e.,
whether all bad candidates after c can be deleted. If this is not the case, then much as above there
is no hope for the chair to be sure to reach her goal, since for example even a single future bad
candidate that cannot be deleted may be ranked on top of every vote in the worst case.
Let us finally consider (with all the things eliminated above not being on the table as possibilities
that we have to deal with here) the case where at least one good candidate is currently winning and
k ≥ b. If there are no revealed, still-standing bad candidates, return that we have a forced win (as
there will be no bad candidates at the end and at least one good one, so there will certainly be a good
one among the winners), and so henceforward assume we have at least one revealed, still-standing
bad candidate.
Let B be the highest current plurality score among all revealed, still-standing bad candidates,
according to the votes masked down to the revealed, still-standing candidates.
A best strategy for the universe, regarding seeking to defeat the chair’s goals, is as follows.
All future bad candidates are in a top-segment of each vote. This forces the chair to expend
k−b deletions on removing those future bad candidates.
The interesting twist here is what a hostile universe can do with future good candidates. Note
that future good candidates can, if not deleted, steal first-place votes from existing good candidates
that are winning or otherwise doing well.
The most effective attack a hostile universe can do, given that it is already going to force us
to remove all future bad candidates, is to leave B as the strongest score of any bad candidate (the
universe has no tool left to increase beyond B since it is—for a different compelling reason—making
us spend our deletions to burn away all future bad candidates, and the existing bad candidates
already are revealed and so can only move down in how many votes they are at the top of as more
candidates are revealed in the votes; but moving them down would play against the universe’s
interests here). So the universe’s best strategy is to also use new good candidates to try to decrease
the scores of all revealed, still-standing good candidates to at most B− 1, while also ensuring that
no added good candidates score more than B− 1. Of course, the chair would try to stop this, by
deleting good candidates as needed (at most k− b deletions of good candidates though, on top of
the b deletions of bad candidates that the universe can force to be needed bad-candidate deletions).
Let g be the number of future good candidates. If k− b ≥ g, we (the chair) have a forced win
(recall that a good candidate is currently winning), as we can remove all of those candidates.
What about the case k−b < g? Note that the universe then can add g− (k−b) good candidates
(of our choice, not its choice, but it turns out that our choice won’t help us here against an optimally
hostile universe). The most effective thing the universe can try to do is to use these new good
candidates to try to draw all the revealed, still-standing good candidates down to at most B− 1
first-place votes, while also not letting any still-standing-at-the-end good candidate (including ones
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added after the moment this problem is looking at) get more than B−1 first-place votes.
Let S denote the set of all revealed, still-standing candidates i for which score(i)≥ B. Note that
the “surplus” of each member i of S is score(i)− (B−1), and the universe is trying to in effect shed
these surpluses onto future good candidates that don’t get removed by the chair, while ensuring that
none of those candidates itself ends up with B or more first-place votes. The universe will have at
least ‖S‖+g− (k−b) candidates over which to do this spreading.
It is thus not hard to see that if ⌈ ∑i∈S score(i)
‖S‖+g− (k−b)
⌉
≥ B,
then we (the chair) have a forced win, since we can ensure that at least one current or added good
candidate will have score at least B. And if the above ceiling is less than B, we do not have a forced
win, as the universe can by adding good candidates ensure that all good candidates still-standing at
the end have score at most B−1.6
This completes our polynomial-time algorithm (that is “called” up to two times—with c left in,
and if k > 0 then also with c removed), and so gives us an overall polynomial-time algorithm for
online-plurality-CCDC, as promised.
That online-plurality-CCAC is in P can be shown similarly. A difference is that now we have
two types of candidates: qualified candidates who are certainly in the election and spoiler candidates
who can possibly be added by the chair. Therefore, instead of speaking of candidates to be deleted
(or not), our algorithm will now speak of spoiler candidates to be added (or not). In particular,
when we are in the case that at least one good candidate is currently winning (according to the votes
masked down to the still-standing candidates up to the current point), in order to check whether no
bad candidate after c can enter the election (which would immediately destroy the chair’s hopes),
we now need to check whether all bad candidates after c are spoiler candidates (which the chair
simply doesn’t add).7 Now, the hostile universe’s best strategy against the chair (leading to our
worst-case scenario) can be described similarly to the above best strategy of the universe in the
case of online-plurality-CCDC, except that we consider “good candidates after c that are qualified”
instead of “good candidates after c that cannot be deleted.”
6How does the universe do this, given that it doesn’t know which up to k− b good candidates we will delete? If it
did know which, how to do this balancing is immediate. But what it will do is it will as the votes are revealed for each
future good candidate make them consistent on the up-to-then revealed candidates with what it would do with those votes
if that one were to be the next member of its set of at least g− (k−b) good candidates to add. If the chair removes the
candidate, it will then try that same approach again with the next to-be-revealed good candidate. Not knowing which
still-in-the-future-at-that-point candidates will be allowed in is not a problem, since the universe does not have to commit
to their locations in the votes until the moment the candidate is revealed for possible deleting by the chair. So by the end,
the universe has indeed added a set of at least g− (k−b) good candidates such that no still-standing good candidate has
more than B−1 first-place votes. Note of course that this process never requires the universe to have a member of S take
a point “away” from another member of S, which is good as that simply can’t be done. Rather, it is the incoming good
votes that are used to drain away the points from the members of S.
7Note that the chair can decide not to add any of the future spoiler candidates; only the number of spoiler candidates
that can be added is limited. In fact, the chair will never add a bad spoiler candidate coming after c. Note also that just
a single future candidate that is both qualified and bad would kill off the chair’s chances to reach her goal, since this
candidate will take the top position of each vote in the worst case.
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The destructive cases can be handled analogously as well, with just a few changes. Consider
online-plurality-DCDC with essentially the same notation used above for online-plurality-CCDC.
In particular, d, σ , c, k, b, and B have the same meaning, except that the distinguished candidate
d has now turned from a good into a bad candidate, since the chair’s goal now is to make sure
that no one “d or worse” is a winner (i.e., we now refer to the candidates in {a | a >σ d} as good
candidates and to the other ones as bad candidates). We can handle both the non-hand-tied chair
model (where, recall, the chair may delete some, but never all, bad candidates) and the hand-tied
chair model (where, recall, the chair may never delete any bad candidate). However, here we will
simply mention just some key differences, starting with the former. For instance, when we are
in the case that at least one good candidate is currently winning (according to the votes masked
down to the still-standing candidates up to the current point) and we need to check whether all bad
candidates after c can be deleted in the non-hand-tied chair model, we have to check whether either
some already revealed bad candidate up to now has been labeled as undeleted and k ≥ b, or no
already revealed bad candidate up to now has been labeled as undeleted and b = 0. If this is not
the case, there is no hope for the chair to reach her goal, as even a single future bad candidate that
cannot be deleted in the non-hand-tied chair model will be ranked on top of every vote in the worst
case and thus wins. That is, the chair doesn’t have a forced win in this case. Similarly, the rest of
the argumentation can be slightly adapted to show that online-plurality-DCDC in the non-hand-tied
chair model is in P.
The proof that in the hand-tied chair model also online-plurality-DCDC is in P differs from the
above proof only slightly. For instance, instead of checking whether all bad candidates showing up
after c can be deleted, we now check only whether b = 0, as we are not allowed to delete any bad
candidate in the hand-tied chair model.
Finally, incorporating in the proof of online-plurality-CCAC ∈ P the changes corresponding to
those that turned the proof of online-plurality-CCDC ∈ P into a proof of online-plurality-DCDC ∈
P (though disregarding the issue of whether the chair is hand-tied or not), we see that
online-plurality-DCAC is in P as well. ❑
5 Conclusions and Open Directions
This paper’s contribution is a model and a number of results for the research direction of candidate-
sequential elections—a direction that we feel is of interest, not as a replacement for the study of
voter-sequential elections, but as a notion that captures different but also important settings. Our
results show that online candidate-control can be extremely complex, but that for the most important
real-world election system, plurality, candidate control can be quite simple—even of polynomial
time-complexity.
It will be important to seek further results for the complexity, in this model, of natural systems.
It would also be interesting to formalize and study online control by partition of candidates in
sequential elections. Another interesting direction will be to also give the chair limited or total
control over the candidate presentation order; in political science, for example, in many settings
control of agenda-order can be powerful.
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